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Both conceived of the individual as "a being both social and evil,"4 perpetually struggling to prevent the innate aggressiveness of the species from plunging society into a Hobbesian war of all against all. That is why Freud insisted that it "has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man's aggressive instincts,"5 a view advanced over a century earlier by Maistre. Events in Europe after 1789 led many conservatives such as Maistre, as events after 1914 would lead Freud, to reject the common Enlightenment view of human beings as naturally sociable and of social life as a reflection of the spontaneous harmony of a natural world governed by laws established by God and discoverable by reason. In Maistre's view, social and political life are better understood as the artificial and fundamentally precarious imposition of order on the violent flux of nature. Anticipating Freud, he asserts that individuals, if left to their own devices in society, would soon be plunged into a state of social warfare identical to that which Hobbes had attributed to the state of nature. His particular brand of extreme conservative thought derives its social and political authoritarianism from these deeply pessimistic social assumptions, which leave him with more in common (on this subject) with Freud than with either the Enlightenment or fellow conservatives such as Edmund Burke.
Homo Homini Lupus
The pessimistic, even tragic, argument of Civilization and Its Discontents is that human beings are driven by extremely powerful instincts, the full satisfaction of which is incompatible with social life. According to Freud, the "cultural frustration" that ensues from this incompatibility "dominates the large field of social relationships between human beings. As we already know, it is the cause of the hostility against which all civilizations has to struggle."6 Unhappiness, understood as the non-satisfaction of these basic libidinal urges, is therefore a necessary part of human association. "One feels inclined to say that the intention that man should be 'happy,' " Freud writes pessimistically, "is not included in the plan of 'Creation.' " 7 Freud also argues that, in addition to these basically erotic instincts, there is a "constitutional inclination in human beings to be aggressive towards one another,"8 which "constitutes the greatest impediment to civilization."9 found among immediate neighbors.16 However, this aggression can also be "internalized" by directing it back at its source, where it is "taken over by a portion of the ego, which sets itself over against the rest of the ego as superego, and which now, in the form of 'conscience,' is ready to put into action against the ego the same harsh aggressiveness that the ego would have liked to satisfy upon other, extraneous individuals.""7 The tension that develops between the "strict" super-ego and the "subordinate" ego Freud calls guilt, which is manifested as "the need for punishment."'8 This "internal policeman," the superego, reduces somewhat the need for the external repression of aggression.
Thus, according to Freud, society rests precariously upon the basis of an ineliminable dialectic of aggression and repression. Our sexual drives and primal aggressiveness are locked in a perpetual struggle with both the superego of the individual and the social superego. These innate destructive forces occasionally shatter the fragile bonds of society against which they are in constant, incipient rebellion, erupting in violent bursts of destruction and barbarism such as the Reign of Terror and the First World War. Although Freud claims that "what we call our civilization is largely responsible for our misery and that we should be much happier if we gave it up and returned to primitive conditions,"'9 he nonetheless believes that we are also social beings, and that the achievement of civilization lies in its ability to control and direct our destructive anti-social tendencies, which it does, in part, through interalization and the "sublimation" of erotic energies. However, this achievement comes at the price of our happiness and leads to the "tormenting uneasiness" of civilized life.20
Although Freud accepted the need for a considerable degree of instinctual repression, he also believed that moder civilization had more than met this need, and had actually become excessively restrictive. One of the objectives of psychoanalysis is actually to "oppose the super-ego" and to "endeavour to lower its demands" under such conditions. Notwithstanding this belief in the need for reform, Freud denied the possibility of the transcendence of this primal struggle between Eros and Thanatos, which underlies social life and individual psychology. While he was sympathetic to critics of civilization, he was unwilling to offer any such "false" consolation.
Freud combines the psychological assumptions of Aristotle and Hobbes to produce a theory according to which society is a source of both human fulfillment and frustration. In effect he sought to replace conventional views about human nature with a more complex psychological theory that combined elements from other theories traditionally regarded as contradictory. In 16 Ibid., 51. The influence of David Hume on the trend away from concepts such as the state of nature, the social contract, and natural law was considerable at this time. His 1748 essay "Of the Original Contract" presents a strong case against the "fallacious and sophistical" theory of the social contract.36 He also subjected the whole enterprise of moder natural law theory and its assumptions to the same kind of devastating skeptical critique. Natural law, natural rights, and contract theory were also increasingly challenged in the years after 1750 by new doctrines such as utilitarianism, so that by the end of the century there was at best a "half-hearted and often inconsistent rejection of some and acceptance of other parts of the contractarian system."37
With very few exceptions, therefore, the philosophes believed in the natural sociability of the species.38 In his Persian Letters (1721), for example, Montesquieu relates this belief to a rejection of the contractarian idea of a pre-social state of nature. "Every discussion of international law that I have ever heard," he writes, "has begun with a careful investigation into the origin of society, which seems to me absurd .. There is nothing but violence in the universe; but we are spoiled by the modem philosophy that tells us that all is good, whereas evil has tainted everything and that in a very real sense all is evil, since nothing is in its place. In addition to this emphasis on the anti-social proclivity of human nature, Maistre rejected the Enlightenment belief that the universe is governed by "an essential, general and natural order."58 There had been a broad consensus among the philosophes that nature is governed by an orderly system of uniform and regular laws, created and presided over by a remote, benevolent deity and discoverable by sensory experience. By studying the orderly patterns of nature individuals could come to know these natural laws and thereby understand and, to some extent, even control their world. " commonwealth, as was order, was a human creation.68 Among the most pessimistic accounts of the ruthlessness and violence of nature to be found anywhere occur in Maistre's mature writings, with their notorious descriptions of constant blood-letting as natural, inescapable, and, up to a point, even beneficial. In Considerations on France he claims that "when the human soul has lost its strength through laziness, incredulity, and the gangrenous vices that follow an excess of civilization, it can be retempered only in blood," which is "the manure of the plant we call genius." Mankind, he says, is a tree "which an invisible hand is continually pruning." And as with a tree, "the skilful gardener directs the pruning less towards lush vegetation than towards the fructification of the tree; he wants fruit, not wood or leaves."69
Maistre devotes a chapter to "the Violent Destruction of the Human Species," noting that the "illustrious" Buffon "has proven quite clearly that a large percentage of animals are destined to die a violent death."70 He then adds that Buffon "could apparently have extended the demonstration to man,"71 which is precisely what Maistre proceeds to do, beginning with a long "frightful catalogue" of the wars of recorded history. "Unhappily," he concludes, "history proves that war is, in a certain sense, the habitual state of mankind, which is to say that human blood must flow without interruption somewhere or other on the globe, and that for every nation, peace is only a respite. Hobbes was perfectly right, provided that one does not give too great extension to his principles; society is really a state of war. We find here the necessity for government. Since man is evil, he must be governed; it is necessary that when several want the same thing a power superior to the claimants judges the matter and prevents them from fighting. The individual must "lose itself in the national mind, so that it changes its individual existence for another communal existence, just as a river flows into the ocean still exists in the mass of water, but without name and distinct identity."81 Like Hobbes, Maistre reasoned that it is better to be subject to any sovereign (even a Robespierre or a Napoleon) than to none at all.82 His criticism of the French Revolutionary leaders was not that they undermined authority, but rather that they abused it. This was, however, a lesser evil in Maistre's eyes than the liberal attempt to limit power. For Maistre disorder was the public evil most to be avoided. In his first major work, Considerations on France (1797), he not only attacked the Revolution but attempted to refute the arguments of more moderate constitutional republicans and liberals such as Benjamin Constant. One lesson that many liberals such as Constant drew from events in France after 1793 is that a constitution must be devised and adopted that would permanently prevent the juggernaut of political power-whether led by divine right absolutists or revolutionary Jacobins-from crushing individual liberties. This, they held, requires the dispersal of social and political power, which had been concentrated and centralized under both Bourbons and Revolutionaries.
Maistre drew exactly the opposite political lesson from the same events. He did not interpret the Revolution as an argument against a strong and unified political sovereign. Quite the opposite, in fact. In Considerations on France, written partly to refute Constant's "ugly pamphlet" De la force du gouvernement actuel de la France et de la necessite de s y rallier (1796), Maistre refers favorably to Rousseau when defending the "absolute and indivisible" nature of sovereignty and condemning the popular liberal idea that sovereignty can be represented.83 The Revolutionary leaders, to the extent that they were able to marshall the forces of the nation and take decisive measures to save France from her enemies, were preferable to carping liberal critics like Voltaire, who were responsible for unleashing the Revolutionary tiger from its cage in the first place, and were opposed to authority per se. The Jacobins, on the other hand, "leave in the imagination a certain impression of grandeur that is the result of the immensity of their success."84 Thus, the counter-revolutionary Maistre wrote of Robespierre that this "infernal genius alone could perform this prodigy.... This monster of strength, drunk with blood and success, this terrifying phenomenon ... was at once a terrible punishment sent upon French men and the sole means of saving France."85 This position with respect to the Revolutionary leaders is quite consistent with Maistre's overall belief in the imperative of authority and the need for a sovereign that is "one, inviolable, and absolute."86
It is important to note that, although some measure of violent disorder is inescapable in human affairs, according to Maistre, this takes place in the broader context of a providential order ordained by God. Society, as part of the natural order, must be considered in the general frame of a supernatural order which is subject to God's true design for the cosmos. terms. Like Hegel, Maistre was, in part, undertaking a theodicy in writing this work. "If Providence erases," he claims, referring to the destruction wrought by the Revolution, "it is no doubt in order to write."87 Thus, the Revolutionaries are merely "the instruments of Providence" working towards ends unknown to them.88 "We cannot repeat too often," Maistre writes, "that men do not lead the Revolution; it is the Revolution that uses men. They are right when they say it goes all alone. This phrase means that never has the Divinity shown itself so clearly in any human event."89 Running through the violent maelstrom of revolution, in other words, is a divine logic that is perfectly ordered, even though it is not apparent to human beings. This theme is also central to Maistre's St. Petersburg Dialogues, subtitled "Conversations on the Temporal Government of Providence." For Maistre, God uses disorder in the affairs of men and in nature to maintain a greater, cosmic equilibrium.
Conclusion
At the heart of the social psychology of both Maistre and Freud is a question that had commanded the attention of social contract theorists such as Hobbes and Rousseau and would fascinate sociologists such as Comte and Durkheim: what keeps human beings together? According to Maistre and Freud, the French Enlightenment tended to overlook this fundamental question, with disastrous consequences. The striking social naivete of the philosophes blinded them to the deep tensions and complexities in social life and the powerful disintegrative forces that pose a constant threat to social order. For the philosophes, society, being natural, reflects the spontaneous harmony they attributed to nature. As such, social order does not in itself present a problem to them. The "problem," as far as most were concerned, was to maximize individual freedom by liberating the mind and power of human beings from the fetters of social custom and prejudice. This entailed a reduction in social control so that individuals would be capable of reasoned, independent action.
We have seen that Maistre and Freud agreed with the philosophes that humans are naturally social beings. At the same time, however, they also placed great stress on the anti-social tendencies in human nature and the deep tensions that exist at the heart of social life. In this they were the heirs of Hobbes. Consequently, they did not support the "emancipatory" social and political project of the French Enlightenment. Maistre and Freud feared that significantly loosening social, religious, and political bonds on individuals could precipitate the collapse of the fragile edifice of society, as evidenced, 87 Considerations on France, ch. 2, 20 (OC, I, 21). 88 Ibid., 19.
Maistre believed, by events in France in the second half of the eighteenth century. Contractarianism is correct, on this view, to the extent that it conceives of social order as something that depends on a considerable measure of human artifice, rather than as something that arises naturally and spontaneously. The philosophes and their successors failed to diagnose a deep-seated "problem of order" that lies at the very heart of modem civilization. The emphasis of Maistre and Freud on the power of the centrifugal forces that threaten social order and the weakness of our rational faculties in the face of them, led both to seek surrogates for reason to combat these disintegrative pressures. Foremost among these for Maistre are religious and patriotic sentiments, the "solid bases of all possible first and second order institutions."90
The social theory of Maistre, like that of Freud, defies categories according to which society is held to be either natural or artificial. Instead, individuals are seen as complex and dynamic beings, with many contradictory tendencies. It is this novel combination that furnishes Maistre's thought with a sinister modernistic edge that gives his work, like Freud's, a disturbing relevance to the twentieth-century reader missing in more moderate varieties of conservatism.
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